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Navies in Violent Peace

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strategic analyses that the ten themes of the book seem to be drawn.

Part III carries forward from the end of World War II to the present. Colin Gray kicks off by discussing the role sea power plays today in the defense of the Western alliance. In the following chapter Roger Barnett contrasts this with Soviet maritime strategy. Barnett with Jeffrey Barlow, provides readings of declassified and unclassified U.S. Navy documents addressing naval strategy from the end of WW II to the present. It is a wonderful chapter that illustrates both the continuity and the durability of U.S. naval thinking over those four decades. In Chapter 14 Barnett attempts to treat the dichotomy of maritime and continental strategies as a matter of emphasis, i.e., as complementary not competitive matters. In the last chapter Gray and Barnett combine to summarize themes and offer some pointers for the future.

This book is the most thorough and well-balanced discussion recently published of the complex issues surrounding the relationship of sea power and strategy. Thankfully it makes no attempt at force-building or sizing naval forces. It is about the utility and nonutility to a nation of effective naval forces, whatever the composition of those forces might be. This book is for the serious reader, but not solely for the professional strategist; there is much for the general public to make use of as well. Indeed Part I, "The Basics," makes an excellent primer for the novice, while the "Contemporary Maritime Strategy" discussions of Part III will challenge the national security specialist. "Strategy and History" in Part II keeps everybody honest.

The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy (or, as some call it the Maritime Component of the U.S. National Strategy) that emerged in the 1980s has a thousand fathers, but Roger Barnett is one of the few with a legitimate claim to that relationship. Both he and Colin Gray have been in the forefront of the defense of that strategy for some time. This book is clearly the capstone of that defense. But it is much more, because it is not so much about *the* Maritime Strategy as it is about maritime strategy. Therefore, it belongs on the desk of every war college student and every fleet planner, and in every Washington office with responsibility for national security affairs. I would wager that Admiral Chernavin has already read it.

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Cable, James. *Navies in Violent Peace.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 155pp. $45

Navies in Violent Peace is a summary and update of Sir James Cable's many writings on naval diplomacy. With five books and numerous articles on the topic, Cable is the most prolific and perhaps the most insightful authority on the role of navies in peacetime. To a great extent, this new volume represents the collection of his wisdom, and is therefore both an excellent

introduction to and fast-paced survey of naval missions infrequently addressed: gunboat diplomacy, showing the flag, "estate management at sea," and suppression of pirates and terrorists. Not simply justifying the maintenance of navies in peacetime, the author attempts to place these missions in a context of the use of navies in limited and general war. The general conclusion, if the book can be said to have one, is the acknowledgement of a paradox: although built for war, navies are used more frequently as diplomatic instruments in peace. By definition, the outbreak of an actual war represents a failure of the peacetime diplomatic-deterrent mission.

Even for readers familiar with the topic, Cable's book is particularly refreshing because of its non-American perspective. The author is more than willing to question the premises of the Maritime Strategy—but on a historical rather than ideological basis. His concern is that a maritime campaign can never be kept limited or non-nuclear because of the fact that naval vessels, unlike land forces, are symbols of national sovereignty. If one accepts the premise that "nuclear war at sea offers overwhelming advantages to the Soviets," the Maritime Strategy may appear to have less of a deterrent effect than presumed. Caution is advised before nations gamble their maritime power on a single role of the "iron dice." Navies are worth more, the author suggests, as political or diplomatic tools than as actual weapons, and risk to them should be weighed carefully. Cable's arguments are not quite an apology for Admiral Jellicoe's choice at the Battle of Jutland, but one sees the shadow of the "risk theory" in them.

But his real concern is that governments do not realize the full impact of navies on peacetime diplomacy and may therefore be willing to sacrifice maritime capabilities on the altar of budget cuts. His unspoken target is the British parliament, and his favorite example of the advantages of a navy that has out-of-area capability is recovery of the Falklands by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. With such arguments it would appear that he opposes such cuts. However, his language—in that typical British fashion—is understated: Cable admits that "countries only concerned to defend their own coasts against seaborne attack might prefer to sacrifice a small navy to strengthen their air force or even, as some countries already do, to let their sailors man coastal artillery or otherwise stand guard ashore." His conclusion is that, in truth, with the exception of the superpowers only Britain and France possess ocean-going navies. With this in mind, Cable hints at the implications of the difference between British and French deployments, quoting Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, RN: "The French pattern . . . has been to maintain rather low-capability forces permanently in such areas as Djibouti and the southern Indian Ocean, while the British have deployed balanced forces of several

powerful warships about once a year on peripatetic tours." Which style of deployment is more effective is a question that should have been developed more fully.

While certainly worthy of its audience, there are certain flaws in this book that are probably more apparent to its American than its British readers. These flaws are the result of the author's reliance on *The Times* (of London) as his primary and often sole source for details of current operations, whereby journalistic exaggerations are used to buttress his theoretical arguments. For example, discussion of the costs of long deployments and limits upon naval reach elicits the comment that "in 1980 the nuclear-powered carrier *Nimitz* managed 100 days at sea in the Indian Ocean, but discipline suffered among her crew." This reviewer "managed" around 120 days in the *Ranger* in the following years but saw no such extraordinary discipline problems. Of course, Cable's favorite source for American naval theory is the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, "in spite of some stylistic eccentricities . . . a journal of the highest standards." Who are we to disagree?

A particularly strong area of the book is a discussion on piracy and terrorism at sea; Cable concludes that the maritime nations are not doing enough to suppress piracy in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the U.S. Navy's capture of the terrorists of the *Achille Lauro* is portrayed as a successful employment of naval force in a situation with considerable potential for political conflict. The final chapter, on naval arms control is the weakest, but perhaps this simply reflects the ambiguity of the topic. As Cable points out, treaties affecting navies can always be interpreted vaguely. The Soviets now openly refer to the *Kiev* as an "aircraft-carrying cruiser," yet it passes through the Montreux Convention-controlled Dardanelles without Turkish protest. So much for treaty restrictions on warships.

Since *Navies in Violent Peace* is the latest and best *brief* treatment of the peacetime role of navies, it should be sought out and read. Unfortunately, it is expensive for only 155 pages. However, the book's brevity and its need for more detailed American source material should only encourage the author—and perhaps some among its readers—to attempt a more definitive version.

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Hattendorf, John B. and Robert S. Jordan. *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 373pp. $55

There is more to the dust jacket of this book than meets the eye. Bernard F. Gribble's fine oil painting "The Arrival of the American Fleet at Scapa Flow, 7 December 1917, being Greeted by Admiral Beatty and the Crew of HMS *Queen Elizabeth*"